VESTED AND CONTINGENT INTERESTS AND
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.
Mr. Kales' takes the ground that Mr. Gray's exposition of
the distinction between vested and contingent interests is
capable of some further development. Mr. Kales then
makes some criticism on the definition given by Mr. Gray,
and on his position as to the application of the rule against
perpetuities to remainders. He points out that it is of vital
importance to a writer on the rule against perpetuities to
know what the exact difference is between a vested and contihgent remainder. It is proposed in this article to offer a
few suggestions on the subject
What is a contingent remainder, and what is the exact
nature, if it can be ascertained, of the contingency upon
which a contingent remainder is contingent?
According to the principle of the common law, there could
be no interval between the preceding estate and the remainder. The remainder must fall into place immediately upon
the termination of the preceding estate, and if it did not
do so, its opportunity to take effect as a remainder was
gone forever.
An estate, therefore, which was so limited that it might
not take effect as a remainder at the proper time, was said
to be a contingent remainder, by which, it is.apprehended,
was meant that it was contingent whether it would ever be a
remainder.
The contingency then, upon which a contingent remainder is contingent, is the uncertainty that it will take effect
'Article, "Several Problems of Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities.
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immediately upon the termination of the preceding particular
estate, which will halpen whenever it is limited to take effect
upon an event other than the termination of the preceding
particular estate itself. If the event happens too late, the
remainder cannot make connection with the preceding particular estate, and therefore is not a remainder at all. It is
nothing.
This might occur in two ways: (x) because the event
upon which the remainder was limited to take effect might
not happen before the termination of the preceding particular estate; (2) where the remainder was limited to a
person not yet ascertained, or who might not be ascertained
2
before the termination of the preceding particular estate.
All four classes of Mr. Fearne may be reduced to these
two heads.
Mr. Fearne's four classes, as quoted by Mr. Josiah Smith
in his treatise on Executory Interests, at page 65, are as
follows:
I. "Where the remainder depends entirely on a contingent
determination of the preceding estate itself; as if A makes
a feoffnient to the use of B till C returns from Rome, and
after such return of C, then to remain over in fee."
II. "Where the contingency on which the remainder is
to take effect, is independent of the determination of the
preceding estate; as if a lease be made to A for life, renainder to B for life, and if B dies before A, remainder to
C for life."
III. "Where a remainder is limited to take effect on an
event, which. though sure to happen some time or other, yet
may not happen until after the determination of the particular estate; as if a lease be made to J. S. for life, and after
the death of J. D., the lands to rempin over to another in
fee."
'This is the classification suggested by Lord Chief Justice Willes,
in Smith v. Packhurst, 3 Atk., 135, 1742, (1) where a remainder
is limited to a person not in being, and who may possibly never exist;
(2) where the remainder depends on a contingency collateral to the
continuance of the particular estate.
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IV. "Where a remainder is limited to a person not ascertained, or not in being. at the time wheln snch limitation is
made ;" as if a lease be made to one for life, remainder to
the right heirs of J. S., who is living; or remainder to the
first son of B, who has no son then born; or if an estate be
limited to two for life, remainder to the survivor of them
in fee.*
As to Mr. Fearne's classification, it may be observed, as
to the first class, that the remainder may never take effect at
all, if the contingency upon which the particular estate is to
determine never happens, or happens after the preceding
particular estate has regularly come to an end. The termination of the preceding estate, therefore, is a termination by
the happening of a collateral event which is uncertain. That
the second and third classes are practically the same. The
second is where the contingency is independent of the termination of the preceding particular estate; and the third,
where the event may happen after the termination of the
preceding particular estate. The third, therefore, is simply
a sub-division of the second, and in all these cases, if the
event happens after the termination of the preceding estate,
the remainder is void, not because it is limited upon a contingency, but because there is then a gap between the termination of the preceding estate and the beginning of the
next estate, which gap or ".beyance in seisin was not permitted by the common law.
The first three classes of Mr. Fearne may therefore be
reduced to the second class of Lord Chief Justice Willes,
which may be stated thus: Cases where the remainder is
limited to take effect upon the happening of an event other
than the regular termination of the .preceding particular
estate.
There remains, therefore, the fourth class of Mr. Fearne
and the first class of Lord Chief Justice Willes, where
'Mr. Smith's statement is valuable, as he adds an example . of
each class.
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the person who is to take is unascertained, which is obviously not reducible to the same princilple as obtains in the
other class. As to this class, a distinction must be taken; In
the case of a devise to A for life, and after his death to the
heirs of B, a living person, the remainder to the heirs of
B is contingent. It partakes, however, of the first class,
in that there is a contingency upon which the remainder
may never take effect, that is, if B survives A, and may be
considered as belonging to the second class, in that the persons who are to take (the heirs of B) are unascertained.
Where there is a devise to A for life, and after his
death to his heirs, the case is different. Here there is no
contingency that the limitation will never take effect as
a remainder. It will fall in place immediately upon the
death of A. The remainder is said to be contingent because
there is no one ascertained at the present time to take, which
leads to a consideration of the other difficulty which was
felt at common law in allowing the validity of contingent
remainders.
Under the feudal theory, the fee was the unit of ownership in land, and no subdivision of that unit could be allowed
which would interfere with the feudal duties due to the
lord of the fee. If, therefore, the owner of the fee made a
grant thereof, and divided it into smaller particular estates,
he must so limit such estates that they fit together exactly,
one after the other, without interval or overlap. There
could not be two persons occupying the fee at the same
time, and there could be no interval of time when the fee
was unoccupied.
It was therefore apparent, that a contingent remainder
being only a possibility until the event happened, existed
solely outside of the fee, and had no place in the compact
mass of estates into which the fee was divided until the
event happened. When that occurred, the remainder, which
was to be valid, must take its place with the other estates,
and in some manner acquire a portion of the seisin of the
fee. Some estate must be displaced in order to make room
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for the new member, and as there was no feoffment upon
the happening of the contingency, the common law lawyers
found great difficulty in evolving any theory upon which the
seisin could pass to the newly arrived remainderman. The
difficulty was tinally overcome, however, by the fiction of.saying that the seisin remained in the feoffer until the happening
of the event, and then passed on from him to the remainder-

man.
A contingent remainder, therefore, may be defined as
follows: A contingent remainder was, at common law, a
limitation of an interest in real estate, which might never
take effect as a remainder owing to the circumstance that it
was limited to an unascertained person, or limited to take
effect upon an event other than the regular termination of
4
the preceding particular estate.
A vested remainder at common law was an estate given
to an ascertained individual and limited to take effect upon
no other event than the regular termination of the preceding
particular estate.5
Mr. Kale, in the article above referred to,6 points out that
the conception of what is a contingent remainder has
changed in modern times. He instances: The cases which
present themselves under modern statutes, of how far a
contingent remainderman has a right to ask for partition
or call trustees to account. In such cases, the courts have
4
Mr. Gray offers no definition of a contingent remainder. Mr.
Fearne's definition is as follows, Contingent Remainders, page 3: "A
contingent remainder is a remainder limited so as to depend on an
event or condition which may never happen or be performed, or which
may not happen or be performed till after the determination of the
preceding estate, for if the preceding estate determine before such
event or condition happens, the remainder will never take effect."
"Mr. Gray (Rule against Perpetuities, .2nd edit., sec. xoz) draws
the line between vted and contingent remainders thus: "A remainder is
vested in A, when throughout its continuance A, or A and his heirs,
have the right to immediate possession whenever and however the preceding estate may determine." Does not a remainder coming within the
definition suggested fulfill the requirement laid down by the learned
author?
'20 Harvard Law Review, 192, 1907.
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abandoned the feudal notion of what is a remainder, and
it is submitted, rightly so. At common law, a remainder
was none the less vested even though it might never take
effect. It would be absurd, however, to permit a person
who might never have any interest in the land, to compel a
partition, or permit a person who might never have any
interest in the fund, to compel the trustee to file an account.
It would seem, therefore, to be a practical common sense
rule, that the only person who could compel proceedings in
such cases would be a person who possessed an interest
which was sure to come into effect. This difference, therefore, in the conception of what is a contingent remainder
is explainable by the practical necessities of the case.
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.

The rule against perpetuities, as finally defined by Mr.
Gray, 7 is as follows: "No interest is good unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest."
It is submitted, with diffidence, however, that this is not
the rule against Perpetuities at all. The rule itself destroys
certain interests limited upon contingencies which may occur
after a certain period.
The interests which the rule does not destroy, that is,
which are not within its purview, are the interests which
are good. So far as the rule is concerned, Mr. Gray's
statement, therefore, simply describes the class of future
interests to which the rule does not apply. It is therefore
respectfully submitted that it is not a statement of the rule
at all. The relation which Mr. Gray's statement bears to
the rule itself may be shown by an illustration: Suppose
an act were passed, making it unlawful to enter a dwelling
house after eleven o'clock at night without the consent of
the owner. If there were no further law on the subject,
an entry in the daytime without the consent of the owner
Gray on Perpetutitks, 2nd edit., sec. .20.
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would be lawful. The law punishes an entry made after
eleven o'clock. It is, however, a statement only of the
practical result of the law to say, that no entry in a dwelling
house, without the consent of the owner, is lawful unless
made before eleven o'clock at night.
If we assume that the rule does not apply to vested interests, it must be stated so as to destroy only contingent
interests, and the following form is suggested:
All future interests which are limited to an unascertained
person, or to take effect upon a contingency other than the
regular termination of the preceding particular estate, are
void whenever such person may possibly not be ascertained
before, or the contingency may happen after, the expiration
of a life or lives in being at the creation of the interest, and
twenty-one years thereafter. It is believed, that this statement of the rule is clearer and tuore easily understood than
the one suggested by Mr. Gray, and when borne in mind
in this form, many difficulties in the subject.will disappear.8
ROLAND R. FOULKE.

'This is very much the language in which the learned author
himself referred to the Rule (Gray, Restraints on Alienation, 2nd edit.,
sec. 272), where he said: "The Rule against Perpetuities declares that
every estate or interest which requires the happening of a contingency or
the arrival of a time certain as a condition precedent, is bad unless the
contingency must happen or the time must arrive within a life or lives in
being and twenty-one years."

